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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1602 
_____________ 
 
RICHARD D. TURZAI, 
Appellant, 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; ROBYN L. BOTTESCH,  
Individually and as an officer for the City of Pittsburgh;  
  JOSEPH REIFF, Individually and as an officer for the City of Pittsburgh;  
  THOMAS HENDERSON, Individually and as an officer  
for the City of Pittsburgh;  
 MATHEW TURKO, individually and as an officer 
 for the City of Pittsburgh;  
   GEORGETTE A. SCAFEDE, Individually and as an officer  
for the City of Pittsburgh 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-01740) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
and STENGEL,* District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 13, 2012) 
 
*Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
STENGEL, District Judge.   
 This is an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the City of Pittsburgh, et al., on Richard Turzai’s claims against all defendants under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of liberty without due process of law, malicious 
prosecution, and violation of his First Amendment rights, and against the individual 
defendants under Pennsylvania law for malicious prosecution, false arrest, invasion of 
privacy, and illegal detention.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment with respect to all federal question claims and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s remaining claims arising under Pennsylvania law after declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction.  We will affirm.
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 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the facts or 
procedural history of this case. 
                                              
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our standard of review 
applicable to an order granting summary judgment is plenary.”  Nasir v. Morgan, 
250 F.3d 366, 368 (3d Cir. 2003).  When the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, we may affirm the order of the District Court.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 
805-06 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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 Turzai first contends that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
regarding Turzai’s malicious prosecution claims because the District Court did not 
consider all of Turzai’s contentions as they applied to his first arrest for criminal trespass 
and simple mischief, which he asserts lacked probable cause.  Specifically, Turzai 
maintains that the arrest warrant prepared by Detective Bottesch does not establish 
probable cause because it omitted a property survey that created conflict over the 
ownership of the disputed property.  Yet, Turzai acknowledges that Bottesch was unable 
to obtain a copy of the survey despite her unsuccessful attempts to meet with Turzai at his 
residence prior to obtaining the arrest warrant.  We agree with the District Court that the 
detective’s failure to consider Turzai’s survey or mention it in the affidavit does not 
negate probable cause for the charges.  Bottesch interviewed neighbors who witnessed 
Turzai urinating on the side of Berard’s home on two separate occasions and posting 
distasteful signs on her porch.   The District Court did not err in finding that the 
circumstances known to Bottesch would warrant a reasonable officer to believe that it 
was more likely than not Turzai committed the crime of simple trespass and criminal 
mischief.  Those reasonable beliefs alone are enough to establish probable cause and 
would not be negated if Bottesch unearthed the elusive property survey and included 
reference to an alleged boundary dispute in the arrest warrant.   
 Furthermore, Turzai’s argument that the District Court failed to understand 
Turzai’s state law claims, much less consider them, is inherently flawed.  The District 
Court did not examine Turzai’s state law claims because it dismissed those claims 
without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  The District 
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Court considered the facts underlying those claims insofar as they created issues of fact 
with regard to Turzai’s federal claims.  Turzai’s rebuke of the District Court for its failure 
to acknowledge an additional state law claim against Bottesch is unintelligible given the 
Court’s discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over those state law claims. 
Still with regard to the first arrest warrant, Turzai also contends that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Turzai’s malicious prosecution 
claim because the charge of stalking was not supported by probable cause.  Turzai asserts 
that the first arrest warrant “entirely omits the undisputed fact that Berard never feared 
bodily injury, and that she never suffered severe emotional distress” as required for the 
charge of stalking.  Appellant’s Brief at 31.   However, the District Court properly found 
that Berard feared bodily injury.  Her repeated reports to police outlined an ongoing, 
childish, but escalating, property dispute.  By his own admission, Turzai posted signs that 
could reasonably be viewed as intending to cause Berard substantial emotional distress.  
We find the District Court did not err in finding that the charge of stalking was supported 
by probable cause. 
In addition, Turzai argues that omissions and misrepresentations eliminated 
probable cause for all three charges.  We are unpersuaded by Turzai’s various 
contentions.  The District Court appropriately did not draw an unwarranted inference 
from the allegation that Berard had a personal relationship with a police officer who was 
not involved in the proceedings against Turzai.  Moreover, the District Court correctly 
found that even removing the various alleged misrepresentations and adding alleged 
omissions to the affidavit, probable cause still existed.  Finally, the Appellant 
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misconstrues Berard’s personal interactions with the Magistrate Judge, attempting to cast 
doubt on the impartiality of the proceedings.  We find these arguments unavailing and the 
District Court correctly did not draw unreasonable inferences from Turzai’s 
unsubstantiated allegations.   
Next, Turzai argues that the District Court erred when analyzing Turzai’s second 
arrest for retaliation against a witness.  Turzai alleges that Officer Scafede maliciously 
prosecuted him and deprived him of liberty without due process of law when he filed an 
affidavit of probable cause seeking to charge him with retaliation.  We have cautioned 
that “[t]he probable cause determination is to be made only after considering the totality 
of the circumstances, which requires courts to consider the cumulative weight of the 
information set forth by the investigating officer in connection with reasonable inferences 
that the officer is permitted to make based upon the officer’s specialized training and 
experiences.”  United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002)).  Here, Scafede’s affidavit of probable cause 
detailed an interaction in which Turzai told Berard “you can’t have me thrown in jail and 
get away with it.”  Scafede was aware of the escalating dispute after her review of prior 
police reports and the no-contact order that she believed applied to both Turzai and 
Berard.  The District Court did not err in its finding that the totality of the circumstances, 
including the police reports documenting the un-neighborly feud as well as Scafede’s 
multiple conversations with Berard, Turzai, Mr. and Mrs. Buck, Novak, and the 
Magistrate Judge, led Scafede to the reasonable conclusion that plaintiff probably 
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committed the crime of retaliation against a witness.  Thus, the District Court correctly 
found that there was probable cause to arrest Turzai for retaliation against a witness.   
 Finally, Turzai contends that the police officers in this case are not entitled to 
qualified immunity and the City is liable under the doctrine of municipal liability. The 
District Court found that, even if the plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation, 
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff did not set forth 
sufficient evidence to show that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer what the 
law required under the facts alleged.  We need not discuss Turzai’s qualified immunity 
argument because the plaintiff failed to show probable cause was lacking and, therefore, 
cannot establish a constitutional violation by any individual defendant.   
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  
